"Navigation" is the name I've given to the art
and skill of altering the future. I feel that "futurism" doesn't
cut it; futurism focuses on prediction rather than manipulation, and most
futurists as-seen-on-TV focus on a single future, which is presented
as either utopian or dystopian. Navigation is the art of choosing
between
futures. At issue is not "good" and "bad", but "better" and "worse".
At issue is not the probability of a future, but how the probability can
be affected by our actions.
The underlying formalism for goal-based decision-making is covered in
TMOL::Logic::choices,
but it's worth exploring a simplified version. We start with a goal
(or set of goals)
G, and assume that there's some way of calculating
the value of
G for any future F (say, the "fulfillment" of
G in
F times the "desirability" of G in F).
Each future has an estimated probability P given the present; for
example, the probability of "nanowar" might be 30%. When considering
a choice, each possible action leads to a different probability spectrum
for the possible futures; A1 might lead to "nanowar" with a probability
of 30% and to "Singularity" with a probability of 50%, while A2
might lead to "nanowar" with a probability of 20% and to "Singularity"
with a probability of 45%. Given all that, there's an obvious arithmetical
method of calculating the value of an action:
Value(A) = Sum for all F: (Value(G in F) *
Probability(F))
One then chooses the action with the highest value.
I've never used the zeroth-order formalism directly, of course.
Any form of cognition which can be formalized mathematically is too simple
to contribute materially to intelligence. I've never used the arithmetic
at all; getting the relative quantities right, to within an order of magnitude,
is enough to yield unambiguous advice. (This rule is itself part
of the second-order theory of navigation: "If the first-order theory
doesn't give strong advice, or the advice is sensitive to minor fluctuations
in the model of reality, then navigation is the wrong skill for making
the decision.")
However, I've used heuristics that are derived from examining the formalism.
For example, if the utility of a particular effort is measured by its effect
on the probabilities of the possible outcomes, then it's clear that what
matters is not the absolute value of any of the probabilities, but how
large the shift in probabilities is. Likewise, the importance of
a particular shift in probabilities is measured by the difference in value
between the two futures.
The principles of navigation, mostly derived from the second-order theory,
are actually simpler than the formalism:
Know when one future is definitely more desirable than another.
Know which futures are probable enough to care about.
Know which probabilities are easiest to alter.
If an action makes the probability of one future go up (or down), know
which other probabilities are going down (or up) as a result.
Know the best time to act.
It's often important to remember the relativistic nature of navigation.
For example, some people would prefer a Singularity that occurs via uploading
(1) rather than a pure artificial
intelligence. I rather doubt that it makes a difference whether a
grown-up's mind started out as a baby human or a baby AI, but let's assume
that there exists a significant probability that humanborn Minds are nicer
than AI-born minds (and that this probability is greater than the probability
that AI-born minds are nicer than humanborn Minds, and that "nicer" represents
a significant differential desirability which is approximately equal in
both cases). Is it necessarily rational to take actions that will
increase the probability of an uploading Singularity relative to an AI
Singularity by trying to sabotage AI efforts? (2). No, because
intramural fighting would reduce the probability of both Singularities,
thus increasing the probability of nanowar. (See A.3: Deadlines.)
These are the rules of navigation, as best I've learned them:
Don't toast the planet; don't lose permanently. (3).
Before you can create X, you must create the potential for X. (4).
Clemmensen's Law: "IMO, the existing system suffices to permit technological
advance to the singularity. Any non-radical change is unlikely to advance
or retard the event by much. Any radical change is likely to retard the
event because of the upheaval associated with the change, regardless
of the relative efficiency of the resulting system."
Or as I would put it: "Don't meddle." Don't get sidetracked
into subproblems of sociology or politics, no matter how great the enthusiasm
or indignation.
When dealing with a large group of humans, assume that at least one will
take the undesirable action you're worried about.
It is the responsibility of a navigator to emotionally accept all the possibilities,
and to plan for any that have a reasonable chance of occurring.
1: "Uploading": Transferring a human mind to a computer and
upgrading it to a superintelligence. If you're reading this page,
you should know what uploading is.
2: I actually
heard this proposed on at least one occasion.
3: As
long as intelligent life exists in some form, there's a chance for some
better future to exist. Even if intelligent life is wiped out, an
Earth inhabited by bacteria is better than a completely sterile planet;
the bacteria might evolve into intelligent life again one day. A
sterilized planet ends all possibilities. To worry about minor variations
in desirability is foolish when faced with the prospect of a complete loss,
so "Don't toast the planet!" is the first rule of navigation.
4: This
is the art of creating the potential for things, rather than attempting
to do them directly, which is the same art used to create minds that are
organic rather than crystalline. A related heuristic is planning
so that even if you fail in your direct goal, progress has still occurred.
Both are themes running all through PtS. Flare creates the potential
for Aicore. Aicore creates an industry, so that even if our own Elisson
project fails, there'll still be a river of effort flooding into AI.
Early subgoals of the PtS plan create the potential for later subgoals.
But subgoals, if successful, also count as absolute progress towards the
Singularity, even if the rest of the plan fails.
5: One of the chief tricks is learning
to tell the difference. Hidden variables have already been decided,
or are so strongly specified by the structure of reality that nothing you
can do will affect them. This doesn't necessarily mean that you know
which way they've been decided; there can be multiple arguments
in favor of different values for the hidden variables. It's very
easy to confuse delicately-balanced arguments with delicately-balanced
systems, and thereby fall into the trap of assuming that intervention,
or meddling, or pouring on more effort, can affect the outcome. Sometimes,
if a projection presents an unpleasant outcome, our instinct is to meddle;
to do something, anything, for the sake of doing something. But the
emotional satisfaction of "doing something" often masks the side effects,
and the damage, and the fact that the true value of the hidden variable
is not altered in the least.